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Abstract 
If a dispute arises with the host-State, in which an investment was made, the investor may face 
uncertainty, how a dispute will be characterised and therefore solved. Does the dispute arise out 
of an investment contract and has to be referred to the national courts in the host-State? Or is 
there a possibility to arbitrate these disputes before an international tribunal? What happens, if a 
dispute arises out of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT)? Could there also be the possibility of 
overlapping jurisdiction of an international and a national body? What impact do dispute settle-
ment provisions, either in a contract between the investor and the host-State, or in a BIT between 
two States, have on the forum of the dispute? Are they exclusive or may they coexist? If they 
coexist, does one prevail over the other? Is it even possible that a contractual dispute settlement 
agreement is valid in terms of a BIT provision between the two States, that is, is it feasible lo 
depart from such a provision? In this context, the present paper focuses on three recently ren-
dered awards of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (JSCID). Part I 
gives a brief introduction into the topic. Part II provides general principles of JCSID. Part ITl 
analyses the Vivendi Univerisal v Argentine Republic ICSID case. Part N analyses the SGS v 
Pakistan ICSTD case. Part V analyses the SGS v the Philippines ICSID case. Part VJ concludes 
the topic. 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) com-
prises approximately 12500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
With the ratification of the International Convention for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) in 1965, for the first time a system was 
instituted under which non-State entities - corporations or individuals - can sue 
States directly. International law applies directly to the relationship between the 
host State and the investor, and the ICSID Tribunal's award is directly enforce-
able within the territory of the States. 1 
The cases discussed below arise from a "complex and often bitter dis-
pute"2 associated with the investor's right to opt for international arbitration un-
der ICSID if there is a special dispute settlement agreement in an investment 
contract. They are significant as these cases answer this problem and generate 
general principles for the settlement of this kind of dispute. The awards were 
held within a short period and reveal a development in the tribunals ' findings . 
This paper will give an answer to when an investor has to submit the 
claim to a national court and when to international proceedings with ICSID. It 
will critically analyse the mentioned and recently rendered awards. It will draw 
comparisons between the awards themselves and show the development of the 
Tribunals' argument. A further goal is to illustrate the possibilities an investor 
has in relation to the host-State to achieve his objective. 
The present author agrees with the opinion that an exclusively agreed fo-
rum selection clause in an investment contract is not overridden by a bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT) provision in terms of contractual breaches that do not 
amount to treaty claims in the same time. This is an important expression of the 
parties' autonomy. This paper also addresses the question when a claim, based on 
an infringement of an investment contract, amounts to a claim based on a BIT 
through a so-called "umbrella clause". The paper concludes by making alterna-
1 Lauterpacht Elihu "Foreword" to Schreuer Christoph 1-l "The ICSID Convention: A Commen-
tary'' (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 200 I) XI. 
2 Co111paiifa de Aguas de/ Aconquija S.A. & Vh •endi Universal v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitration Proceeding (2001) 40 !LM 426, 427 (ICSID Case o. ARB/97/3). 
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tive suggestions on the interpretation and solution of two problems the Tribunals 
had to deal with. 
II CONTRACTUAL VERSUS NON-CONTRACTUAL ICSID 
ARBITRATION - INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
ICSID arbitration arose traditionally out of investor-State contracts con-
taining express reference to ICSID for dispute resolution, provided that both the 
host-State and the investor's country of origin were parties to the ICSID Conven-
tion and certain other jurisdictional limitations were met. 3 Besides this so called 
contractual arbitration, ICSID also accepts dispute settlements that arise not only 
from a direct agreement to arbitrate between an investor and host-State, but also 
arbitrations that arise from indirect consent to ICSID arbitration - so called non-
contractual arbitration .4 This indirect consent is mostly contained in the host-
State's national investment legislation or BITs. 
Problems arise if there is an overlap of jurisdiction, that is, if both con-
tractual and non-contractual dispute settlement provisions exist and both provide 
for different dispute settlement forums. An investor on the one side might assert 
ICSID jurisdiction whereas the host-State argues in favour of jurisdiction of its 
domestic courts . That was the situation the three present ICSID Tribunals had to 
face. 
A Contractual ICSID Arbitration 
1 Jurisdiction and exclusive remedy rule 
In the context of contractual ICSID Arbitration , Articles 25 and 26 ICSID 
Convention contain the most relevant provisions for the settlement of investment 
3 Blackaby ige l, Paulson Jan , Reed Lucy Guide to ICSID Arbitration (Kluwer L1w Interna-
tional , The Hague, London , New York 2004) 7. 
-1 Blackaby, Paulson , Reed, above n 3, 7 . 
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disputes. Article 25 defines the scope of ICSID jurisdiction. The first paragraph 
of that Article states that "the jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal 
dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any 
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre 
by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the 
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given 
their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally"5. The parties usu-
ally give their consent simultaneously in the arbitration clause or in a separate 
submission agreement. 
Article 26 ICSID Convention as an exclusive remedy rule refers to a tra-
ditional concept of international law, that before relief can be sought before an 
international tribunal, local remedies have to be exhausted. It says that "consent 
of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, 
be deemed consent to such arbitration to exclusion of any other remedy. A Con-
tracting State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial 
remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under this Convention".6 
It implies that there is no more need to exhaust local remedies before ini-
tiating ICSID arbitration " unless otherwise stated". On the other hand, it states 
" the host State's right to insist on the exhaustion of local remedies as a condition 
of its consent to arbitration" .7 Hence, whether domestic court proceedings are 
offered as an alternative to ICSID arbitration, or as a preliminary remedy before 
the institution, depends on the tern1s of the agreement between the parties.8 Nev-
ertheless, it has to be stated, that "Article 26 [ICSID Convention] creates a pre-
sumption that the parties intended to resort to ICSID arbitration to the exclusion 
of all other means of dispute settlement".9 
5 Art 25 (I) !CSID Convention. 
6 Art 26 !CSID Convention. 
7 Schreucr Christoph H The ICSID Conve111io11: A Co111111e111ary (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 200 l) art 26 para 5. 
8 Schreuer, above n 7, art 26 para 36. 
9 Schreuer, above n 7, art 26 para 50. 
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The exhaustion of local remedies as a condition may only be expressed 
up to the time consent to arbitration is perfected. 10 Once consent to ICSID arbi-
tration has been given, the parties have lost their right to seek relief in another 
forum and are restricted to pursuing their claim through ICSID. 11 
Consent to the jurisdiction of domestic courts in derogation of the exclu-
sive remedy rule of Article 26 ICSID Convention need not to be given explicitly. 
Tacit consent may be seen in pleading on the merits before the non-ICSID forum 
without invoking ICSID's exclusive jurisdiction. 12 
On the other hand, Delaume says, "if a court in a contracting State be-
comes aware of the fact that a claim before it may call for adjudication under 
ICSID, the court should refer the parties to ICSID to seek a ruling on the subject. 
Until such a ruling is made, if the possibility exists that the claim may fall within 
the jurisdiction of ICSID, the court must stay the proceedings pending proper 
determination of the issue by ICSID". 13 
Once the ICSID arbitration process has been instituted, Article 26 ICSID 
Convention ensures that the arbitration process will not be interfered with. 14 "The 
Convention provides for an elaborate process designed to make arbitration inde-
pendent of domestic courts. Even in the face of an uncooperative party, ICSID 
arbitration is designed to proceed independently without the support of domestic 
courts". 15 
2 Contractual claims 
Investment contracts, or also called concess10n contracts, are contracts 
between the investor and the host-State. They often contain dispute settlement 
10 Schreuer, above n 7, art 26 para 99. 
11 Schreuer, above n 7, art 26 para 2. 
12 Schreuer, above n 7,art 26 para 44. 
13 Delaume GR "ICSID Arbitration in Practice" (1984) 2 International Tax and Business Lawyer 68. 
14 Schreuer, above n 7, art 26 para 3. 
15 Schreuer, above n 7, art 26 para 3. 
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clauses referring contractual disputes either to domestic or international proceed-
ings. Article 25 ICSID Convention requires that the dispute arises "directly" out 
of an investment. If a contract refers to international arbitration under ICSID and 
the legal basis of the dispute is an infringement of the investment contract, it has 
to be asked if and to which degree ICSID can have jurisdiction over the claim. 
As this is one of the main questions of the present paper this chapter intends to 
focus introductorily on the arbitrability of contractual claims, under the auspices 
of ICSID, based on the mere breach of an investment contract. 
Schreuer states that "an investment operation involves a number of ancil-
lary transactions and legal contracts. They include financing, the lease of prop-
erty, purchase of various goods, marketing of produced goods and tax liabilities. 
In economic terms, these transactions are all more or less linked to the invest-
ment. But whether these peripheral activities arises directly out of an investment 
for purposes ofICSID' s jurisdiction may be subject to doubt" .16 
The ICSID Convention's first draft foresaw the Centre's jurisdiction for 
all legal disputes "arising out of or in connection with any investment". 17 These 
words were criticised as granting a tribunal a wide and too indefinite authority. 18 
Consequently, the term "directly" was included in the Convention. This require-
ment is one of the objective criteria and therefore not at the disposition of the 
parties. 19 "This means that, no matter what the parties have agreed, the dispute 
must not only be connected to an investment but must also be reasonably closely 
connected" .20 
Therefore, disputes arising from ancillary or peripheral aspects of an in-
vestment operation are likely to be objected to the basis that they do not arise di-
rectly out of an investment and are not covered by the consent agreement.21 Later 
on in this paper, this distinction will become more relevant as respondents to the 
16 Schreuer, above n 7, art 25 para 64. 
17 ICSlD History, Volume I, 166. 
18 Schreuer, above n 7, art 25 para 65. 
19 Schreuer, above n 7, art 25 para 67. 
20 Schreuer, above n 7, art 25 para 67. 
21 Schreuer, above n 7, art 25 para 67. 
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discussed awards objected to the claims being contractual in nature and therefore 
not subject to ICSID' s scope. 
In Holiday Inns v Morocco, the Tribunal emphasised the general "unity of 
an investment operation" and claimed jurisdiction over questions arising out of a 
loan contract. At the same time, it held that certain aspects of the contracts could 
be "isolated" and that questions affecting the indirect or secondary aspects of an 
investment can properly fall within the jurisdiction of local courts.22 
Article 2 (b) of the Additional Facility Rules authorises proceedings for 
the settlement of disputes that are not within the scope of ICSID's jurisdiction as 
they do not directly arise out of an investment. "Therefore, where the connection 
between the investment and the dispute appears too remote to satisfy ICSID 
Convention's requirements of directness, the Additional Facility could serve as 
an alternative method of dispute settlement".23 
B Non-contractual ICSID Arbitration 
As already mentioned, consent in local investment laws of the host-State 
and BITs make it possible for investors to initiate ICSID Arbitration against host-
States even if there is no contractual agreement between the parties. This so 
called "arbitration without privity" is possible because Article 25 ICSID Conven-
tion requires that the parties only "consent in writing" to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre, but not how the consent has to be given .24 So long as the consent is clear, 
mutual and in writing, it is sufficient to establish ICSID jurisdiction.25 The num-
ber of ICSID arbitrations under BlTs has arisen dramatically due to the prolifera-
tion of some 2000 treaties providing for this dispute settlement as of the year 
2003. 
22 Holiday Inns v Morocco ( 12 May /974) 1CS1D Case No. ARB/72/1. 23 Schreucr, above n 7, art 25 para 69. 
24 Blackaby, Paulson, Reed, above n 3, 35. 25 Blackaby, Paul son, Reed, above n 3, 35 . 
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1 Bilateral investment treaties 
BITs are concerned with the relationship between an investor, either a na-
tional or a company of one contracting party (home-State), and the other con-
tracting party (host-State) in connection with an ' investment' , taken in a very 
broad sense, in the territory of the latter.26 
BITs are conceived as generating reciprocal rights and duties among state 
parties.27 Those state rights and duties concern the rights and duties of private 
investors of one country, in the territory of the other. In the formulation of basic 
principles that will control the relationship between a private foreign investor and 
a host state, the private investor was absent and replaced by its own state 
throughout BITs negotiations. 28 
The preamble of most BITs express the States' desire to create favourable 
conditions for greater investment by investors of one State in the territory of the 
other State.29 It also recognizes that the encouragement and reciprocal protection 
under an international agreement will be conducive to stimulating individual 
business initiatives and increasing prosperity to state parties.30 
At the same time, every modern BIT includes provisions on the settle-
ment of investment disputes, as part of the guarantees assumed by the host-State, 
in relation to the foreign investment made by nationals of the other contracting 
State.31 In nearly all the treaties, the host-State gives its consent to international 
arbitration of any investment dispute, subject to the treaty. 32 
26 Feclax NV v Venezuela ( 1997) 37 ILM 1378, (I CSID Case o. ARB/96/3) para 32. 27 Sacerdoti Giorgio " Bilateral Treati es and Multilateral lnslrumenls on In vestment Protection" 
( 1997) 269 Rec uei I des Cours 253, 436-438. 
28 Vinuesa, Rat'II Emilio " Bilate ral Investment Treaties and the Settlement of Investment Di s-
putes under ICSID: The Latin American Experience" (2002) Law and Business Review of the 
Americas 50 I, 504. 
29 Lowenfe ld lmemwional Econo111ical Law (Internati onal Economic Law Seri es, Oxford Uni -
versity Press, Oxford , 2002) 474. 
30 Vinuesa, above n 28, 505 . 
31 Lowenfe ld , above n 29, 484. 
32 Lowenfe ld, above n 29, 484. 
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BITs may also contain blanket provisions obligating the host-State to ob-
serve, or guarantee the observance of, specific undertakings towards investors. 
These clauses are referred to as "umbrella clauses" . The present Swiss Pakistan 
and Swiss Philippine BIT contained such , albeit slightly different, clauses. In 
each case, the central question was whether the " umbrella clause" enabled an in-
vestor's claim against the host-State, based on a breach of the investment con-
tract, to be 'elevated' to a BIT claim and resolved under the arbitration provi-
sions of the applicable BIT, rather than under the dispute resolution provisions of 
the investment contract under dispute. 33 The effect of this clause was addressed 
by the SGS v Pakistan ICSID Tribunal that had to deal the first time with the 
clause's interpretation. Its relevance will be dealt with below. 
2 Bilateral investment treaty claims 
When an objection is raised to ICSID ' s arbitral jurisdiction provided un-
der a BIT, it follows that jurisdiction should be tested by the Tribunal, which is 
accomplished through two different sets of legal requirements. First, BIT juris-
dictional requirements must be met. Second, ICSID Convention jurisdictional 
requirements must be also met. Both sets of requirements perform a sort of dou-
ble filter in order to confirm ICSID' s jurisdiction.3~ 
In general terms, BITs require the parties to attempt, as far as possible 
through direct negotiations between the parties, to settle the dispute amicably. If 
a solution is not reached within a certain period, the dispute may be submitted 
either to a competent domestic tribunal of the contracting party in whose tenitory 
the investment was made, or to international arbitration like ICSID. 
The procedural dispute resolution mechanism in BITs may give both par-
ties, or sometimes the investor alone, a seri es of options ranging from pursuing 
the claim in the local courts of the host-State, to bringing ICSID arbitration, or to 
33 Asian Arbitration " Briefing" (Fresh fi e lds Bruckhaus Deringer, May 2004) 
<http://www.freshfields.com/places/as ia/publi cations> (last accessed 4 August 2004) I. 34 Vinuesa, above n 28, 503. 
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resorting to another form of international arbitration. Some BITs state, that once 
an investor has submitted the dispute to the courts of the contracting party con-
cerned or to international arbitration, the choice of one or the other of those pro-
cedures is final. 35 Such a mechanism is commonly called a "fork in the road" 
provision. 36 The French Argentine BIT contained such a provision and the Tri-
bunal, as well as the ad hoe Committee, had to deal with the question when this 
provision was activated. The Tribunal's finding will be discussed below. 
C Overlap of Contractual and Non-contractual ICSID Jurisdiction 
As a matter of general principle, the same set of facts can give rise to dif-
ferent claims grounded on differing legal orders: the domestic and the interna-
tional legal orders. BIT claims and investment contract claims appear reasonably 
distinct in principle.37 Complexities, however, arise particularly where each party 
claims that one legal body has jurisdiction over both types of claims which are 
alleged to co-exist. 38 
This can raise fundamental questions in tern1s of the competing jurisdic-
tion of the dispute settlement systems under ICSID and those of the domestic 
courts. If a claim is based on a breach of a foreign investment contract, the inves-
tor may also try to settle the dispute through ICSID instead of lodging the claim 
according to a stipulated dispute settlement clause before the domestic courts. 
This can be based on the investor's reasoning that the dispute relates, besides 
purely investment contractual questions, to ones of an investment dispute. The 
investor could further argue that a dispute purely contractual in nature amounted 
to an investment dispute. As it will be seen in the following cases, the investors 
always argued in favour of dispute settlement through ICSID rather than domes-
tic proceedings. Due to various reasons, an international forum might be seen to 
35 See art 8 (2) Argentine French BIT. 
36 CompaFifa de Aguas del Aconqwja S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitration Proceeding, above n 2, 439. 
37 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v lsla111ic Republic of Pakistan (2003) 18 ICSID 
Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal 307 (ICSJD Case No. ARB/01/13) para 147. 
38 SGS Societe Genera le de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
148. 
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be more attractive for an investor than a domestic one. On the other hand, a host-
State as the respondent in a dispute is likely to object that the dispute relates 
solely to questions of an investment contract and is therefore purely contractual 
in nature and has to be decided through the domestic courts. 
As will be discussed in the following, the three present ICSID Tribunals 
had to face such a situation where both a contractual and a non-contractual forum 
selection clause and an overlap of jurisdiction existed. The findings of the Tribu-
nals were highly significant insofar as they not only decided the cases but also 
developed general principles governing future decisions of this subject matter, 
though, the findings were not beyond doubt. The present paper will discuss the 
cases and raise critical thoughts. 
III VIVENDI UNIVERSIAL v AGENT/NE REPUBLIC 
A Introduction 
The case arose from a dispute associated with the Concession Contract 
for Water and Sewage Service in the Province of Tucuman (Concession Con-
tract) that the French company Vivendi Universal - formerly Compagnie Ge-
nerale Des Eaux (CGE), and its Argentine affiliate Compania De Aguas Del 
Aconquija S.A. (CAA; both hereinafter referred to as claimants) made with Tu-
cuman in 1995, a province of Argentina, and with the investment in Tucuman 
resulting from that agreement. The Republic of Argentina (respondent) was not a 
party to the Concession Contract or to the negotiations that led to its conclusion. 
The Argentine Republic is a party to a BIT of July 1991 with the Repub-
lic of France (French Argentine BIT). 39 Both the Argentine Republic and France 
are also parties to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), which entered 
39 Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of France for the Promotion and 
Rec iprocal Protection of Inves tments of July 1991. 
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into force for both states prior to signature of the Concession Contract by CGE 
and Tucuman. 
The Concession Contract does not refer to either the French Argentine 
BIT or ICSID Convention or to the remedies that are available to a French for-
eign investor in Argentina under these treaties. Under Article 16 (4), it refers dis-
putes, concerning both the interpretation and application of the contract, to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the contentious administrative courts of Tucuman. Arti-
cle 8 of the French Argentine BIT as the relevant provision provides that: 
[1] fan investment dispute arises between one contracting party and an investor from an-
other contracting party and that dispute cannot be resolved within six months through 
amicable consultations, then the investor may submit the dispute either to the national 
jurisdictions of the contracting party involved in the dispute or, at the investor's option, 
to arbitration under the ICSID Convention or to an ad hoe tribunal [pursuant to the arbi-
tration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law]. ( ... )Once 
an investor has submitted the dispute to the courts of the contracting party concerned or 
to international arbitration, the choice of one or the other of those procedures shall be fi-
nal. 
In terms of the actions of the federal government of Argentina as well as 
those of the provincial authorities of Tucuman, CGE contended that the Argen-
tine Republic itself had violated its obligations under the French Argentine BIT 
by virtue of the attribution to that central government of the acts of the Province 
of Tucuman. 4° CGE and CAA had made claims solely under the French Argen-
tine BIT and not contractual claims under the Concession Agreement.41 
With regard to the question of jurisdiction, Argentina was, inter alia, of 
the opinion that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the claims related to 
rights and obligations under the Concession Contract, and that, accordingly, Ar-
ticlel6 (4) required the claimants to bring those claims before the Contentious 
4° Co111pa,1fa de Aguas de/ Aconqwja S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Repllb!ic Original 
Arbitration Proceeding, above n 2, 438. 
41 Compaiifa de Agllas de/ Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitration Proceeding, above n 2, para 53. 
15 
Administrative Tribunals of Tucuman.42 Argentina in fact regarded Article 16 (4) 
of the Concession Contract as a waiver of ICSID jurisdiction.43 
B The Tribunal's Finding in the Original Arbitration Proceeding 
1 Jurisdiction over the claim 
On 21 November 2000 the Tribunal rendered its award.44 Due to the close 
relationship between the jurisdictional issue and the underlying merits of the 
claims, the Tribunal decided that it would not be able to resol ve the jurisdictional 
question without a full presentation of the factual issues relating to the merits.45 
Accordingly, the Tribunal , after receiving memorials from the parties and hear-
ing oral argument, joined the jurisdictional issue to the merits.46 It held that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the claims of CGE against the Argentine Republic for viola-
tion of the obligations under the French Argentine BIT.47 Neither the forum-
selection provision of the Concession Contract, nor the provisions of the ICSID 
Convention and the BIT on which the Argentine Republic relied, precluded 
CGE' s recourse to this Tribunal on the facts presented.48 
One could have expected the Tribunal to di scuss Article 16 (4) of the 
Concession Contract in this context but it did not do so. The Tribunal's state-
ments are rather held in general terms at thi s point saying that " those claims are 
not based on the Concession Contract but allege a cause of action under the 
42 Compaiifa de Aguas de l Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitrati on Proceeding, above n 2, 434 para 41. 
43 Co111paii[a de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Un iversal v Argentine Republic Origina l 
Arbitrati on Proceeding, above n 2, 437 para 47. 
44 Compaii fa de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v A rgentine Republic Original 
Arbitrati on Proceeding, above n 2, 428. 
45 Compaii(a de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Origina l 
Arbitrati on Proceeding, above n 2, 428 . 
46 Co111paii(a de Aguas de/ Aconqwja S.A. & Vivendi Universal v A rgentine Republic Orig ina l 
Arbitrati on Proceeding, above n 2, 428. 
47 Co111pa,1(a de Aguas del Aco11q111ja S.A. & Vi vendi Universal v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitrati on Proceeding, above n 2, 428. 
48 Compa,i(a de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universa l v Argemine Republic Origina l 
Arbitrati on Proceeding, above n 2, 428. 
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BIT".49 The Tribunal returned to the question of competing jurisdiction at the 
merit stage. 
Here, it distinguished between claims which concerned acts of the pro-
vincial authorities of Tucuman and the "Federal Claims" which alleged viola-
tions of the BIT through the respondent. In terms of the first group of claims, the 
Tribunal did not consider itself competent to hear the case. These claims were 
purely related to the performance or non-performance of the Concession Con-
tract. 50 
In addressing the claims against Argentina, the Tribunal found that the 
nature of the facts supporting most of the claims made it "impossible( ... ) to dis-
tinguish or separate violations of the French Argentine BIT from breaches of the 
Concession Contract without first interpreting and applying the detailed provi-
sions of that agreement".51 By Article 16 (4) of the Concession Contract, its par-
ties assigned that task expressly and exclusively to the Contentious Administra-
tive Courts of Tucuman.52 Because of this crucial connection between the terms 
of the Concession Contract and the alleged violations of the French Argentine 
BIT, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the "[A] rgentine Republic could not be 
held reliable unless and until the claimants have, following Article 16 (4) of the 
Concession Contract, asserted their rights in proceedings before the Courts of 
Tucuman and have been denied their rights , either procedurally or substan-
tively" .53 That means that, unless the domestic courts denied its jurisdiction, the 
Tribunal thought that ICSID' s jurisdiction over breaches of an investment con-
tract was subordinate to that of the domestic courts in tenns of the interpretation 
of a concession contract- even if a breac h of the BIT appeared possible. 
49 Co111pw1fa de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitration Proceeding, above n 2, para 53. 
5° Co111paii(a de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vive ndi Universal v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitration Proceeding, above n 2, 443 para 77. 
5 1 Co111paiifa de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitration Proceeding, above n 2, 428. 
52 Co111paiifa de Aguas de/ Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitrati on Proceeding, above n 2,429. 
51 Co111paMa de Aguas de/ Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universa l v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitrati on Proceeding, above n 2, 443 para 78. 
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Without expressly discussing the problem of competing jurisdiction be-
tween contractual and treaty claims, the award shows that the parties can select a 
national forum for the dispute settlement in terms of the violation of an invest-
ment contract. The Tribunal wanted to respect this forum in the Concession Con-
tract independent of the possibility that both the Concession Contract and the 
BIT could be breached. In the eyes of the Tribunal, the BIT did not prevail over 
the Concession Contract in terms of possible breaches of both these provisions. 
Confusion arises as the Tribunal first claimed jurisdiction over the claim and then 
denied to address it. Hence, the Tribunal seemed to have worked with a general 
understanding of the term "jurisdiction" and the admissibility of a claim on the 
other side. 
2 Waiver of rights to pursue the claim: ''fork in the road" provision 
The Tribunal adjudicated that claims by CGE in the Contentious Admin-
istrative Courts of Tucuman for breach of the terms of the Concession Contract, 
as Article 16 (4) required, would not have constituted a waiver of claimants' 
rights under the French Argentine BIT and the ICSID Convention.54 It empha-
sized that this decision did not impose an exhaustion of the remedies under the 
BIT because such requirement would be incompatible with Article 8 of the BIT 
and Article 26 of the ICSID Convention.ss To support this opinion, the Tribunal 
refeJTed to the former ICSID award Lanco International Inc. v Argentine Repub-
lic.s6 In that case the contract in question contained an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause refeJTing contractual disputes to a federal contentious administrative court. 
The Lanco Tribunal denied that this clause could exclude ICSID jurisdiction. It 
said:57 
54 Compaiifa de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitration Proceedi ng , above n 2, 428. 
55 Compw1[a de Aguas de/ Aconq11ija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitration Proceed ing, above n 2, 444 para 8 l. 
56 Lanco International Inc. v Argentine Republic ( 1998) 40 ILM 457 (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/6). 
57 Lanco !nterna1ional Inc. v Argenline Republic, above n 56, 469 paras 39 - 40. 
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A Stale may require the exhaustion of domestic remedies as prior condition for its con-
sent to ICSID arbitration. This demand may be made (i) in a bilateral investment treaty 
that offers submission lo ICSJD arbitration, (ii) in domestic legislation, or (iii) in a direct 
investment agreement that contains an ICSID clause. ( ... ) In effect, once valid consent 
to ICSID arbitration is established, any other forum called on to decide the issue should 
decline jurisdiction. 
In Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic, the Tribunal held that the 
claims against the respondent were not subject to the jurisdiction of the conten-
tious administrative tribunals of Tucuman, "if only because, ex hypothesi, those 
claims [were] not based on the Concession Contract but [alleged] a cause of ac-
tion under the French Argentine BIT".58 
This problem arose in the present case as, under the French Argentine 
BIT, the investor had the choice between a national and an international forum 
for dispute settlement. In this context, one has to clearly point out the legal 
grounds of the claim - contractual or treaty ones. According to the Tribunal, the 
"fork in the road" provision can therefore only be enabled if an investor intends 
to pursue a claim on the same legal basis before both a national and an interna-
tional forum. 
C The Annulment Proceeding 
1 Background 
On March 2001, the claimants filed an application with the Secretary 
General of ICSID requesting partial annulment of the above Tribunal's award. 
Claimants argued on three out of the five different grounds provided by article 52 
of ICSID Convention, in support of its request for partial annulment. The appli-
cation was based on the fact that the Tribunal had exceeded its powers. There 
had been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; and the 
award failed to state the reasons on which it was based. 
58 Compaiifa de Aguas de/ Aco11q11ija S.A. & Vivendi Universal l' Argentine Republic Original 
Arbitration Proceeding, above n 2, 438. 
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The appointed ad hoe Committee agreed with the Tribunal in characteris-
ing the dispute as one "relating to investments made under this agreement" re-
garding Article 8 of the French Argentine BIT.59 It held likewise that "the fact 
that the Concession Contract referred contractual disputes to the Contentious 
Administrative Court of Tucuman did not affect the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
with respect to a claim based on the provisions of the BIT. Article 16 (4) of the 
Concession Contract did not in terms purport to exclude the jurisdiction of an 
international tribunal arising under Article 8 (2) of the BIT" .60 The Lanco Inter-
national Inc. v Argentine Republic award, cited by the Tribunal , supported its 
finding on jurisdiction.61 
2 Excess of power 
However, the Committee concluded that the Tribunal had exceeded its 
powers . It had jurisdiction over the Tucuman claims and failed to decide these. 62 
The Committee considered the relationship between the responsibility of Argen-
tina under the French Argentine BIT and the rights and obligations of the parties 
to the Concession Contract. As to the relationship between breach of contract and 
breach of treaty in the present case, the Committee emphasised that some Arti-
cles of the French Argentine BIT did not re late directly to breach of a municipal 
contract but, rather, they set an independent standard.63 The Committee held:64 
A state may breac h a treaty without breaching a contract, and vice versa, and this is cer-
tainl y true or theses provisions or the BJT. ( . .. ) Each or these claims wi ll be terminated 
by reference to its own proper applicable law - in the case or the BIT, by international 
59 Compaiifa de Aguas de! Acon q111ja S.A. & Vivendi Un iversal v Argentine Republic Annulment 
Proceeding (2002) 41 ILM I 135 (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) 11 50. 
6° Co111paiifa de Aguas de! Aconq11ija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argemine Republic Ann ulment 
Proceeding, above n 59, 11 5 l. 
61 Co111paii[a de Aguas de! Aconq11ija S.A. & Vivendi Universa l v Argentine Republic Annulment 
Proceedin g, above n 59, 11 5 l. 
62 Compa Ma d e Aguas d e / Aco11q11ija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Annulment 
Proceeding, above n 59, l I 58. 
63 Compaiifa de Aguas de/ Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Un iversa l v Argentine Republic Annulment 
Proceeding, above n 59, 1154. 
6
~ Com paii fa de Aguas de/ Aco11q111ja S.A. & Vivendi Universa l v Argentine Republic Annulment 
Proceedin g, above n 59, 1154. 
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law ; in the case of the Concession Contract, by the proper law of the contract, in othe r 
words, the law of Tucuman. 
In a case where the essential basis of a claim brought before an interna-
tional tribunal was a breach of a concession contract, a tribunal will give effect to 
any valid forum selection clause in a concession contract.65 This principle applies 
unless the treaty otherwise provides, i.e. the effect of a forum selection clause in 
a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty can override exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses in contracts underlying investments to which the treaty in question ap-
plies66. "On the other hand, where the fundamental basis of the claim is a treaty 
laying down an independent standard by which the conduct of the parties is to be 
judged, the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract between the 
claimant and the respondent State or one of its subdivisions cannot operate as a 
bar to the application of the treaty standard".67 
Creating this rule, the Tribunal remained abstract in its reasoning. It did 
not say on which factors it depended, whether the basis is treaty or contract 
based. This is rather remarkable as it is the key e lement for claiming the right to 
address the claim. It simply considered the essential basis of the present claim as 
being a BIT one. Hence, the Committee created a general rule but failed to ex-
plain how this rule applies. Hereby it argued in favour of an exclusive dispute 
settlement - either under ICSID, or before domestic courts. 
Further on, the Committee was of the opinion that it was not open to an 
ICSID Tribunal , having jurisdiction under a BIT in terms of a claim based upon 
substantive provisions of that treaty, to dismiss the claim on the ground that it 
could or should have been dealt with by a national court.68 In such a case, the in-
quiry to be undertaken by the ICSID Tribunal is governed by the ICSID Conven-
65 Compaiifa de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Un iversal v Argentine Republic Annulment 
Proceedin g, above n 59, 1155. 
66 Co111pa11fa de Aguas del Aconqwja S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argell/ine Rep11blic Annulment 
Proceeding, above n 59, 1162 footnote 69. 
67 Compaiifa de Aguas de/ Aconq11ija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Annulment 
Proceedin g, above n 59, 1155 para 101. 
68 Co111pa,i(a de Aguas de/ Aconquija S.A. & Vi11endi Un iversal v Argentine Republic Annulment 
Proceed in g, above n 59, 1156 para I 02. 
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tion, by the BIT and international law.69 The Committee held that it "[d]id not 
understand how, if there had been a breach of the [French Argentine] BIT in the 
present case (a question of international law), the existence of Article 16 (4) of 
the Concession Contract could have prevented its characterisation as such. A 
State cannot rely on an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract to avoid the 
characterisation of its conduct as internationally unlawful under a treaty".70 
The Tribunal in the original proceedings declined to decide key aspects of 
the claimants' treaty claims on the ground that they involved issues of contrac-
tual performance or non-performance. The Committee was of the opinion that the 
Tribunal would have had jurisdiction over a decision in terms of the concession 
contract, "at least so for as necessary in order to determine whether there had 
been a breach of the substantive standards of the [French Argentine] BIT".71 The 
Committee concluded:72 
The Tribunal, in dismissing the( ... ) claims as it did, actually failed to decide whether or 
not the conduct in question amounted to a breach of the [French Argentine] BIT. ( ... ) 
The conduct alleged by Claimants, if established, could have breached the [French Ar-
gentine] BIT. The claim was not simply reducible to so many civil or administrative law 
claims concerning so many individual acts alleged to violate the Concession Contract. lt 
was open to the claim( ... ) that these acts taken together, or some of them, amounted to 
a breach of Articles 3 and/or 5 of the [French Argentine] BJT. 
Having regard to these considerations, the Committee seemed to deny 
any impact of a contractual forum selection clause in international proceedings. It 
therefore goes further than the Tribunal's finding in the original proceeding, 
which wanted to respect the contractual forum in terms of the application of the 
Concession Contract. With its finding, the Committee crucially extended the 
scope of ICSID' s jurisdiction. 
69 Compaiifa de Aguas de/ Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Annulment 
Proceeding, above n 59, 1156 para I 02. 
7° Co111paiifa de Aguas de/ Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic Annulment 
Proceeding, above n 59, I 156 para I 03. 
71 Compaii(a de Aguas de/ Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argemine Republic Annulment 
Proceeding, above n 59, 1157 para 110. 
72 Compaizfa de Aguas de/ Aco11q11ija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argemine Republic Annulment 
Proceeding, above n 59, 1157 paras 111, 112. 
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It pointed out that concession contracts could be breached without 
breaching a BIT and vice versa. On the other hand, contractual breaches could 
also amount to BIT breaches. It has to be stressed, that the present BIT did not 
include an "umbrella clause" allegedly transferring contractual breaches to treaty 
breaches. The Committee was of the opinion that several acts " taken together" 
could breach provisions in an investment contract and in a BIT, and hence could 
amount to a treaty claim under ICSID. This indicates that the proper forum of the 
claim depends on the legal basis of the breach. In the Committee's opinion, an 
overlap between contractual and treaty infringements would have to be solved in 
favour of ICSID arbitration. 
The Committee mentioned casually in a footnote, that a forum selection 
clause in a bilateral or multilateral investment treaty could override exclusive ju-
risdiction clauses in contracts underlying investments to which the treaty in ques-
tion applies. By focussing on the essential legal basis of a claim, either treaty or 
contractual based, it created a solution with exclusive jurisdiction of the legal 
bodies. Hence, the Tribunal did not need to consider what would happen if both 
dispute settlement clauses applied - a question which is still has to be dealt with 
in this paper. 
IV SGS v PAKISTAN 
A Introduction 
The proceedings, instigated by Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. 
(SGS I claimant) in 2001 under the Swiss Pakistan bilateral investment treaty 
from 1995, arose out of the termination of the contract with the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan (Pakistan / respondent) relating to pre-shipment inspections services 
concerning goods to be exported from certain countries to Pakistan (PSI Agree-
ment). 
SGS had originally sued Pakistan in the Swiss courts, alleging wrongful 
tennination of the agreement. These proceedings were dismissed on the ground 
23 
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that the parties had agreed to resolve disputes under the contract by arbitration in 
Pakistan.73 The contract, which dated back to 1994, contained a dispute settle-
ment provision in Article 11, which stated:74 
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to thi s Agreement, or 
breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall as far as it is possible, be settled amica-
bly. 
Failing such amicable settlement, any such dispute shall be settled by arbitration in ac-
cordance with the Arbitration Act of the Territory as presently in force. The place of ar-
bitration shall be Islamabad. 
Pakistan subsequently commenced local arbitration proceedings, in which 
SGS counter-claimed for damages for wrongful termination of the contract and 
defamation. Having initiated the present ICSID arbitration, SGS took steps to 
oppose the PSI Agreement arbitration. On 4 January 2002, it filed an application 
with the Senior Civil Judge, Islamabad, for an injunction against the PSI Agree-
ment arbitration . SGS further appealed to the Supreme Court of Pakistan on 5 
March 2002. On 3 July 2002, the Supreme Court of Pakistan rendered its final 
decision allowing the respondent to proceed with the PSI Agreement arbitration 
and restraining the Claimant from pursuing or participating in the ICSID arbitra-
tion.75 Nevertheless, SGS disregarded the anti-suit injunction by the Pakistani 
Supreme Court ordering it to desist from pursuing or participating in the case be-
fore ICSID. While the arbitration in Pakistan was underway, SGS pursued ICSID 
arbitration proceedings. 
Shortly after the constitution of the Tribunal, the claimant submitted a re-
quest for provisional measures seeking, among other things, a stay of arbitration 
in Pakistan. The respondent, on the other hand, raised objections to the jurisdic-
tion of ICSID, arguing that the local arbitration was the proper forum to hear the 
parties ' claims. Among other grounds for its objections, Pakistan argued that 
SGS's claims were contractual in nature and that the parties had agreed to have 
73 Asian Arbitration "Brie fin g", above n 33, I. 
74 Art 11 PSI Agreement. 
75 Sociere Generate de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan (2002), Judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Paki stan (Appellate Juri sdic tion) on Civil Appeal Nos. 459 through Secretary Ministry of Fi-
nance, Revenue Di vision, para 78. 
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contractual claims resolved pursuant to the dispute settlement clause in their con-
tract.76 In its request for arbitration, SGS had stated that the scope of ICSID's 
jurisdiction under the bilateral investment treaty encompassed alleged violations 
of the treaty as well as breaches of the contract. 77 
B The Tribunal's Jurisdiction over the Swiss Pakistan BIT Claims 
The Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction over claims about violation of 
the BIT provisions.78 Referring to disputes between a contracting Party and an 
investor of the other Contracting Party Article 9, of the Swiss Pakistan BIT reads 
as follows: 79 
For the purpose of solving disputes with respect to investments between a Contracting 
Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party( .. . ) consultations will take place 
between the parties concerned. If( ... ) consultations do not result in a solution within 
twelve months ( ... ) the dispute shall be submitted to the arbitration of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 
It is significant that this dispute settlement clause neither refers to dis-
putes based on claimed violations of the BIT, nor to disputes based on claimed 
violations of contract between the investor of one contracting party and the other 
contracting party. The Tribunal held that if Article 9 of the BIT "[r]elates to any 
dispute at all between an investor and a Contracting Party, it must comprehend 
disputes constituted by claimed violations of BIT provisions establishing sub-
stantive standards of treatment by one contracting party of investors of the other 
contracting party. Any other view would tend to erode significantly those sub-
stantive treaty standards of treatment". 
76 Polase k Martina " Introductory Note" on SGS Sociere Generate de SwTeiilance S.A. ,. lsla111ic 
Republic of Pakisra11 (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13) 18 ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law 
Journal 290, 291-292. 
77 Polase k. above n 76, 291. 
78 Polasek. above n 76, 291. 
79 An 9 of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Switzerland and the Islamic Republic of Paki -
stan, July II, 1995. 
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Article 9 of the BIT only arranges for recourse to a tribunal constituted 
under the ICSID Convention. No other option is given to the investor by the BIT 
in question. The Tribunal held that there was 'no fork-in-the road provision' in 
Article 9 of the BIT requiring an investor to stay with the forum it has opted for, 
whether in respect of BIT claims or of any other kind of claims. 80 At the same 
time, the Swiss Pakistan BIT did not require prior recourse to the municipal 
courts of the Contracting Party involved. 
Even if the investor had had a choice in terms of the forum, in accordance 
with the Vivendi v Argentina award, the "fork in the road provision" would not 
have been activated by the fact that an investment contract had referred contrac-
tual disputes to domestic proceedings. It would therefore not have affected the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal with respect to a claim based on the provisions of the 
BIT. 
The PSI Agreement was concluded by the parties on 29 September 1994, 
whereas the Swiss Pakistan BIT was signed by the claimant and respondent on 
11 July 1995. On this chronological order, the Tribunal concluded that "[i]t could 
not have been reasonably assumed that the parties to the PSI Agreement intended 
to vest in an arbitrator appointed under that Agreement and the Pakistan Arbitra-
tion Act, 1940, Section 20, authority to pass upon and decide claimed violations 
of the BIT which was then still hidden in the future". 81 The Tribunal therefore 
denied the possibility that access to ICSID could be refused in an investment 
contract concluded prior to a BIT. By this general statement it went further than 
necessary as the relevant provision in the PSI Agreement only referred to dis-
putes "arising out of, or relating to this Agreement" and hence did not include 
claims based on a breach of the BIT. 
On the contrary, Pakistan argued that the arbitrator in the domestic pro-
ceedings of claims on violations of the PSI Agreement would have had jurisdic-
tion not only over such contract claims but also over the BIT claims. The Tribu-
80 SGS Societe Generate de Surveil/a11ce S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
151. 
8 1 SGS Societe Generate de Surveilla11ce S.A. I' Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
153. 
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nal was not of the opinion that SGS's BIT claims against Pakistan were subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Islamabad arbitrator, if only because such claims were 
based not on the PSI Agreement, but rather alleged a cause of action under the 
BIT. 82 "[E]ven if BIT claims were somehow brought before the PSI Agreement 
arbitrator, and the arbitrator were to take cognizance of them, such filing [ would] 
not divest the [ICSID] Tribunal of its jurisdiction to determine the claimant's 
BIT claims". 83 
In talking of "BIT claims" the Tribunal seemed to have thought of a 
situation where a BIT claim was brought before domestic proceedings while both 
investment agreement and BIT existed. It has to be reiterated that the Swiss Paki-
stan BIT did not include a provision giving the investor the choice between two 
forums for the settlement of a treaty claim. It was only scheduled for ICSID 's 
dispute resolution. 84 As already discussed, the typical "fork in the road" provi-
sion could therefore not have been activated. The present Tribunal's finding is 
even more far reaching than the finding in the Vivendi Case as, in the absence of 
such a choice, BIT claims before a national court could apparently not have pre-
cluded ICSID' s jurisdiction . 
C The Tribunal's Jurisdiction over the Contractual Claims 
Having jurisdiction over SGS's BIT claims, the Tribunal denied its juris-
diction over claims under the PSI Agreement.85 However, SGS had asserted the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction not only over the BIT claims of SGS, but also over SGS's 
claims that Pakistan had breached the PSI Agreement. 
In this context, the Tribunal approached the problem that the PSI Agree-
ment was concluded before the Swiss Pakistan BIT. "Does the prior contractual 
82 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above 11 37, para 
154. 
83 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above 11 37, para 
154. 
84 Art 9 of the Swiss Pakistan BIT. 
85 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above 11 37, para 
162. 
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dispute settlement mechanism take priority over the BIT for some or all of the 
disputes between the parties, or does the BIT take priority over the PSI Agree-
ment's mechanism for some or all of the disputes between the parties?"86 
The Tribunal held that disputes arising from claims based on alleged vio-
lations of the PSI Agreement and of the BIT could both be described as 'disputes 
with respect to investments' as Article 9 of the BIT requires. 87 However, it went 
on to state that this characterization of disputes under the BIT "while descriptive 
of the factual subject matter of the disputes, does not relate to the legal basis of 
the claims, or the cause of action asserted in the claims".88 Based on this opinion 
the Tribunal concluded that "both BIT claims and purely contractual claims" are 
not supposed to be covered by Article 9 of the Swiss Palcistan BIT.89 
Accordingly, Article 9 of the BIT did not supersede or set at naught all 
otherwise valid non-ICSID forum selection clauses in earlier agreements be-
tween the Swiss investor and the respondent.90 By this means, the Tribunal de-
clined to decide the problem in general terms resulting out of the chronological 
order of the PSI Agreement and the Swiss Pakistan BIT. While the approach to 
the problem was general, the solution was specific. 
However, the position of the Tribunal relating to purely contractual dis-
putes was clear: "[I]t did not see anything in Article 9 or in any other provision 
of the BIT that could be read as vesting this Tribunal with jurisdiction over 
claims resting ex hypothesi exclusively on contract. ( ... ) [A]rticle 11 of the PSI 
Agreement was a valid forum selection clause so far as concerned the claimant' s 
contract claims which did not also amount to BIT claims"91 
86 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
159. 
87 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above 11 37, para 
161. 
88 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistcm. above 11 37, para 
161. 
89 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
161. 
90 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above 11 37, para 
161. 
9 1 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above 11 37, para 
161. 
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The Tribunal realized that a contractual claim could also amount to a 
treaty claim. While it held that disputes arising from claims based on alleged vio-
lations of the PSI Agreement and the BIT could both be described as "disputes 
with respect to investments", one could have expected a more detailed statement 
from the Tribunal as to why contractual claims did not fall within the scope of 
ICSID. The reasoning mainly based on the Tribunal's "belief' in terms of a lit-
eral analysis of Article 9 BIT does not resolve all doubts. On the other hand, this 
finding makes clear that the Tribunal wanted to respect the dispute settlement 
provision in the PSI Agreement. It can be seen as a reduction of ICSID' s scope in 
comparison to the Vivendi Committee's finding. 
The Tribunal's reference to BITs that 'supersede and set at naught' previ-
ously agreed forum selection clauses and its holding that the latter clauses are 
valid, so far as the claimant's contractual claims do not amount at the same time 
to treaty claims, indicated that treaty claims may not validly be subjected to a 
forum or arbitration clause.92 
At the end of its considerations on its jurisdiction over claims under the 
PSI Agreement, the Tribunal highlighted that parties can grant an ICSID Tribu-
nal jurisdiction over contractual claims by agreement.93 This emphasizes the im-
portance the Tribunal gave individual dispute settlement agreements in the in-
vestment contracts - as far as purely contractual claims are concerned. It might 
also be seen as adhering to the general principle pacta sunt servanda since the 
special forum selection clause is regarded in this way. 
D Transformation of Contractual Claims into Treaty Claims by virtue of 
Article 11 Swiss Pakistan BIT ("Umbrella Clause")? 
92 Spiermann Ole " Individual Rights, State Interests and the Power to Waive ICSID Juri sdiction 
under Bi latera l Investment Treaties (2004) 20 Arbitration International 179, 188. 
93 SGS Sociere Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
161. 
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Furthermore, the Tribunal found that it did not only have to refuse juris-
diction over claims under the parties' contract on the basis of Article 9 of the 
Swiss Pakistan BIT but also over claims based on the "umbrella clause" in the 
BIT.
94 
Article 11 as the relevant provision of the Swiss Pakistan BIT says, that 
"either Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the com-
mitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of 
the other Contracting Party" . 
SGS contended that, through Article 11 , SGS ' s claims grounded on al-
leged violation of the PSI Agreement had been transmuted or "elevated" into 
claims grounded on alleged breach of the BIT. The claimant acknowledged that 
this interpretation was 'far-reaching ', but asserted that nevertheless this is what 
the article means.95 However, the Tribunal did not accept this reading. It high-
lighted that it was the first time that a Tribunal had to examine the legal effects of 
an "umbrella clause".96 Textually it did not appear to the Tribunal that Article 11 
does set forth the consequences or inferences the Claimant had sought to spell 
out.97 " [A]rticle 11 would have to be considerably more specifically worded be-
fore it can reasonably be read in the extraordinarily expansive manner submitted 
by the claimant".98 
In this context, the Tribunal also considered the principle that, under gen-
eral international law, a violation of a contract entered into by a State with an in-
vestor of another State, is not, by itself, a violation of international law.99 Ac-
cording to the claimant' s interpretation, " [a]ny alleged viol ation of [investment] 
contracts and other instruments would be treated as a breach of the BIT. 
100 The 
94 Pola. ek, above 11 76, 29 l. 
95 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
163. 
96 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan. above n 37, para 
164. 
97 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37 , para 
164. 
98 SGS Societe Generale de S11rveilla11ce S. A. v Islamic Rep11blic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
17 l. 
99 SGS Societe Generate de S11rveilla11ce S.A . v Islamic Republic of Pakistan. above n 37, para 
167. 
100 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
168. 
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reading of the claimant was too far-reaching in scope, too automatic and unquali-
fied.101 
In the Tribunal 's op1mon, the claimant's interpretation of Article 11 
tended to make other Articles of the Swiss Pakistan BIT substantially superflu-
ous.102 "[T]here would have been no real need to demonstrate a violation of those 
substantive treaty standards if a simple breach of contract, or of municipal statute 
or regulation, by itself, had sufficed to constitute a treaty violation on the part of 
a contracting party and engaged the international responsibility of the party".
103 
A further consequence of the claimant's reading would have been the possibility 
that an investor could unilaterally and "at will nullify any freely negotiated dis-
pute settlement clause in a State contract". 104 The Tribunal corroborated its per-
suasion as well with the location of Article 11 in the BIT. It was not placed to-
gether with the substantive obligations undertaken by the contracting parties.
105 
"[G]iven the ( ... ) structure and sequence of the rest of the Treaty, it considered 
that, had Switzerland and Pakistan intended Article 11 to embody a substantive 
'first order' standard obligation, they would logically have placed Article 11 
among the substantive "first order" obligations set out in Articles 3 to 7 of the 
BIT"_ 106 
What the Tribunal wanted to stress in this case is that there is no clear and 
persuasive evidence that the claimant's reading was in fact both Switzerland's 
and Pakistan's intention in adopting Article 11 of the BIT. Remarkably, the Tri-
bunal stated that it "is not saying that States may not agree with each other in a 
BIT that henceforth, all breaches of each State's contracts with investors of the 
other State are forthwith converted into and to be treated as breaches of the 
101 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v lsla111ic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
167. 
102 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v lsla111ic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
168. 
103 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
168. 
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106 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
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BIT". 107 It therefore accepted the possibility of an "umbrella clause" turning con-
tractual into treaty breaches but refused Article 11 of the present BIT fulfilling 
these essential requirements. 
This stipulates, generally speaking, the possibility that a purely contrac-
tual claim can amount, under an effective "umbrella clause", to a treaty claim. 
The approach is different to the Vivendi Case as, there, substantive provisions of 
the BIT would have had to be infringed for such an amount, whereas an "um-
brella clause" following the present Tribunal would transform the claim by itself 
to a treaty claim. 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal's adjudication in terms of the alleged present 
"umbrella clause" is consequent in terms of its interpretation of Article 9 BIT 
regarding contractual claims. The Tribunal had a high standard for the require-
ments of an effective "umbrella clause", as it says that it is in general possible to 
agree on such in the BIT, but that these requirements are not met in the present 
case. On the other side, the Tribunal did not point out which requirements have 
to be generally met for an effective umbrella clause, as it only says it is open to 
an agreement between the parties in a BIT. According to the present adjudica-
tion, a BIT should clearly stipulate the "elevation" effect from contractual to 
treaty claims. 
In not addressing the claim in terms of the PSI Agreement, the Tribunal 
expressed its respect towards the contractual forum selections and underlined the 
parties ' contractual freedom. However, in holding that only the specific require-
ments are not met for an effective " umbrella clause", the general relation be-
tween competing dispute settlement clauses in investment agreements and BIT 
was left open. As will be seen, the Tribunal dealt with this question in the follow-
ing case. 
V SGS v PHILIPPINES 
107 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, above n 37, para 
173. 
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A Introduction 
On 26 April 2002, ICSID received from SGS (claimant) a request for ar-
bitration against the Republic of the Philippines (the Philippines/ respondent). 
On 23 August 1991, SGS concluded an agreement with the Philippines regarding 
the provision of comprehensive import supervision services (CISS Agreement), 
under which SGS would provide specialized services to assist in improving the 
customs clearance and control processes of the Philippines. A dispute having 
arisen between the parties concerning alleged breaches of the CISS Agreement, 
SGS invoked in the request for arbitration the provisions of a bilateral agreement 
of 1997 between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of the Philippines on 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Swiss Philippine BIT). 
The Tribunal approached the question of its jurisdiction on the basis that 
m the request for ICSID arbitration, "SGS made credible allegations of non-
payment of very large sums due under the CISS Agreement and claimed that the 
Philippines' failure to pay these was a breach of the BIT". 108 
B Jurisdiction under the "Umbrella Clause": Article X(2) of the Swiss 
Philippines BIT 
The Tribunal in SGS v Philippines had to revert to similar questions as 
had arisen in SGS v Pakistan. As will be shown, it did not in all respects agree 
with the conclusions drawn by the latter Tribunal on issues of the interpretation 
of "arguably similar language" in the Swiss Philippines BIT. 109 
108 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A . v. Republic of the Philippines (2004) (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/6) para 43 . 
109 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
97. 
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The Tribunal held that Article X (2) of the Swiss Philippines BIT "means 
what is says". 11 0 It makes it a breach of the BIT for the host State " to fail to ob-
serve binding commitments, including contractual commitments, which it has 
assumed with regard to specific investments. But it does not convert the issue of 
the extent or content of such obligations into an issue of international law". 111 
Having made an investment in the territory of the Philippines, SGS con-
tended that the respondent breached Article X (2) of the BIT, as services, made 
under the CISS Agreement, were not paid. This failure would grant jurisdiction 
to arbitration under the ICSID Convention .112 In this context, Article X (2) of the 
Swiss Philippines BIT states that "each Contracting Party shall observe any obli-
gation it has assumed with regard to specific investments in its territory by inves-
tors of the other Contracting Party" . 
The Philippines denied that Article X (2) BIT had the effect of turning a 
contractual breach into a treaty claim, relying inter alia on the decision of the 
SGS v Pakistan Tribunal on a similar BIT provision. In the opinion of the Tribu-
nal , " [t]he actual text of Article X(2) would appear to say, and to say clearly, that 
each contracting party shall observe any legal obligation it has ass umed, or will 
in the future assume, with regard to specific investments covered by the BIT" .113 
The object and purpose of the BIT supported an effective interpretati on of this 
Article. 11 4 The Tribunal held: 115 
The BIT is a treaty for the promoti on and reciprocal protec ti on of in vestments. Accord-
in g to the prea mble it is intended ' to create and maintain fa vourable conditi ons fo r in-
vestme nts by investors of one Cont racting Party in the te rritory of the other'. It is legiti -
mate to reso lve uncertainties in its inte rpretation so as to favo ur the protec ti on of cov-
110 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
119. 
11 1 SGS Societe Generate de S11rveillance S.A . v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
128. 
11 2 SGS Societe Genera le de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
l 13. 
113 SGS Societe Generate de S11rveillance S.A. v Rep11blic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
l 15. 
114 SGS Societe Generate de Surve illance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n 108, para 
11 6. 
11 5 SGS Societe Generate de S11rveillance S.A . v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, paras 
11 6- 11 7. 
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erect investments. ( ... ) If commitments made by the State towards specific investments 
do involve binding obligations or commitments under the applicable law , it seems en-
tire ly consistent with the object and purpose of the BIT to hold that they are incorpo-
rated and brought within the framework of the BIT by Article X (2). 
This conclusion is contrary to the interpretation of the "umbrella clause" 
of the Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan. This is based on other circumstances to the 
latter case as well as a different interpretation of the clause of this Tribunal. "It 
should be noted that the 'umbrella clause' in the Swiss Pakistan BIT was formu-
lated in different and rather vaguer terms than Article X (2) of the Swiss Philip-
pines BIT".116 Further on , the Tribunal in SGS v Pakistan relied on the pdnciple 
that a violation of a contract entered into by a State with an investor of another 
State, is not, by itself, a violation of international law. Contrary to this argument, 
the SGS v Phillipines Tribunal found that this pdnciple was applied inappropri-
ately, as the circumstances were different: 117 
[This principle] was affirmed by the ad hoe Committee in the Vivendi case, cited by the 
[SGS v Pakistan] Tribunal. But the [French] Argentine BIT considered in the Vivendi 
case did not contain any equivalent to Article 11 of the Swiss-Pakistan BIT, and the ad 
hoe Committee therefore did not need to consider whether a c lause in a treaty requiring 
a State to observe specific domesti c commitments has effect in internat ional law. 
Having narrowed the scope of the "umbrella clause", the Tribuna l did not 
have any concerns about opposing the interpretation found in SGS v Pakistan. 
The latter Tribunal was afraid of "a full-scale internationalisation of domestic 
contracts" .118 Relating to these concerns, the present Tribunal he ld: 119 
[Article X (2)] does not convert non-binding domestic blandishments into binding inter-
national obligations. It does not convert questions of contract law into questions of treaty 
law. In particular it does not change the proper law of the CISS Agreement from the law 
116 SGS Sociere Genera le de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of th e Philippines, above n I 08, para 
119. 
11 7 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08 , para 
122. 
11 8 SGS Societe Ge11erale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
126. 
11 9 SGS Societe Generate de S11rveilla11ce S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
126. 
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of the Philippines to international law. Article X (2) addresses not the scope of the 
commitments entered into with regard to specific investments. 
A more generous interpretation of the "umbrella clause" in SGS v Paki-
stan might have been refused, as the Tribunal did not want to adjudicate the con-
tractual claims without a specific accreditation. By reference to this Tribunal's 
view, it has to be called into question whether the Tribunal can exercise jurisdic-
tion over contractual disputes concerning an investment, by virtue of the dispute 
settlement clause in the Swiss Philippines BIT, irrespective of any breach of the 
substantive provisions of the BIT. 
C The Tribunals Jurisdiction over Contractual Claims under Article VIII 
of the Swiss Philippines BIT 
Article VII of the Swiss Philippines BIT contains the relevant provision 
for the settlement of disputes between a contracting party and an investor of the 
other contracting party. It reads as follows: 120 
I. For the purpose of solving disputes with respect to investments between a Contracting 
Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party( ... ) consultations will take place 
between the parties concerned. 
2. If these consultations do not result in a solution within six months from the 
date of request for consultations, the investor may submit the dispute either lo the 
national jurisdiction of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment 
has been made or to international arbitration. 
The Tribunal held, that "interpreting the text of Article VIII in its context 
and in the light of its object and purpose, the Tribunal accordingly concludes that 
in principle (and apart from the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the CISS Agree-
ment) it was open to SGS to refer the present dispute, as a contractual dispute, to 
120 Art VIII of the Bilateral agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, March 31, 1997 (Swiss Philippines BIT). 
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ICSID arbitration under Article VIII (2) of the BIT". 121 But at the same time it 
wanted to give effect to the contractual forum selection as BIT provisions should 
not "unless clearly expressed to do so, override specific and exclusive dispute 
settlement arrangements made in the investment contract itself'. 122 
Supporting its finding, the Tribunal mentioned earlier in the award, that it 
was "[c]lear from the general language of Article 25(1) ICSID Convention that 
ICSID jurisdiction could extend to disputes which were purely contractual in 
character. There was no distinction drawn in Article 25 ( ... )between purely con-
tractual and other disputes (e.g. claims for breach of treaty)". 123 
The Tribunal regarded Article VIII to be "an entirely general provision, 
allowing for submission of all investment disputes by the investor against the 
host State." 124 'Disputes with respect to investments' were not "limited by refer-
ence to the legal classification of the claim that is made." 125 A dispute arising 
from an investment contract such as the CISS Agreement was, in the opinion of 
the Tribunal, a dispute with respect to investments. 126 
It was crucial that each of the forums named in Article VIII (2) BIT were 
competent to apply the law of the host State, including its law of contract. 127 If 
the parties to the BIT had intended to limit investor-State arbitration to claims 
concerning breaches of the substantive BIT standards, "they would have said so 
expressly, using this or similar language". 128 Allowing the investor a choice of 
121 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
135. 
122 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
134. 
123 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. V. Republic of the Philippines, above n 108, para 
29. 
124 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n 108, para 
131. 
125 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n 108, para 
131. 
126 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
131. 
127 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
132. 
128 SGS Societe Genera le de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
132. 
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forum is consistent with the goals of the BIT. 129 This interpretation is required to 
avoid "overlapping proceedings and jurisdictional uncertainty".130 It may be nec-
essary to draw distinctions in terms of the forum selection in some cases, "but it 
should be avoided to the extent possible, in the interests of the efficient resolu-
tion of investment disputes by the single chosen forum" 131. 
Therewith, the Tribunal took a different view of the matter than the Tri-
bunal in SGS v Pakistan which refused jurisdiction over contractual claims under 
the Swiss Pakistan BIT while both the relevant provisions in the BITs referred to 
"disputes with respect to investments". Nevertheless, the present Tribunal em-
phasised that it agreed with the concern in SGS v Pakistan that the general provi-
sions of BITs should not, as mentioned above, override specific and exclusive 
dispute settlement arrangements made in the investment contract itself, unless 
clearly expressed to do so. 132 It thought that it was hard to believe that an inves-
tor could bring a contractual claim to ICSID in breaching the investment contract 
at the same time. 133 In terms of its finding, the Tribunal explained that there are 
two different questions: the interpretation of the general phrase "disputes with 
respect to investments" in BITs, and the impact on the jurisdiction of BIT tribu-
nals over contract claims. 134 This concluding remark raises the question whether 
it is possible for an ICSID tribunal to give effect to a contract between the inves-
tor and the host-State "while respecting the general language of BIT dispute set-
] · · ,, 135 t ement prov1s1ons . 
129 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
132. 
130 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
132. 
13 1 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A . v. Republic of the Philippines, above n 108, para 
132. 
132 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
134. 
133 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of th e Philippines, above n I 08, para 
134. 
134 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of th e Philippines, above n I 08, para 
134. 
135 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A . v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
134. 
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D Contractual Claims under the Dispute Settlement Clause of the CISS 
Agreement 
The Tribunal found that the BIT did not override the exclusive jurisdic-
tion clause in the CISS Agreement, or give SGS an alternative route for the reso-
lution of contractual claims, which it was bound to submit to the Philippine 
courts under that agreement. 136 It could not "accept that standard BIT jurisdiction 
clauses automatically override the binding selection of a forum by the parties to 
determine their contractual claims". 137 The CISS Agreement contains with Arti-
cle 12 the relevant dispute settlement clause: 
"The provisions of thi s Agreement shall be governed in all respects by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. All actions concerning disputes in connec-
ti on with the obligations of either party to this Agreement shall be filed at the Regional 
Trial Courts of Makati or Manila." 
The Agreement was concluded on 23 August 1991. Its duration was ex-
tended from 1995 to 1998, then until end of 1999 and, finally , from 31 December 
1999 to 31 March 2000. The Swiss Philippines BIT on the other side was con-
cluded on 31 March 1997. 
The Tribunal held "[p]rima facie Article 12 CISS Agreement is a binding 
obligation, incumbent on both parties, to resort exclusively to one of the named 
Regional Trial Courts in order to resolve any dispute 'i n connection with the ob-
ligations of either party to this Agreement"'. 138 The Article did not constitute 
mere acknowledgement of a jurisdiction already existing by virtue of the non-
derogable law.139 It was evident that the substance of SGS's claim fell within the 
136 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
143. 
137 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
153. 
138 SGS Societe Genera le de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines , aboven n I 08, para 
137. 
139 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
137. 
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scope of Article 12 as being a claim of payment for services supplied under the 
CISS Agreement. 140 
Moreover, Article VIII is a "general provision, applicable to investment 
arrangements whether concluded prior to or after the entry into force of the 
Agreement".
141 
In this context, the Tribunal referred to the maxim generalia spe-
cialibus non derogant. The BIT between Switzerland and the Philippines itself 
was not concluded with any specific investment or contract in view. 142 " It is not 
to be presumed that such a general provision has the effect of overriding specific 
provisions of particular contracts, freely negotiated between the parties". 143 It 
referred to Schreuer that "[a] document containing a dispute settlement clause 
which is more specific in relation to the parties and to the dispute should be 
. d d f 1 1· . ,,144 given prece ence over a ocument o more genera app 1cat1on. 
A further consideration on which the Tribunal based its finding derived 
from the character of a BIT. "[A]s a framework treaty, a BIT is intended by the 
States Parties to support and supplement and not to override or replace the actu-
ally negotiated investment arrangements made between the investor and the host 
State". 145 
As the Swiss Philippines BIT was concluded after the CISS Agreement, it 
had to be discussed, by application of the maxim !ex posterior derogat legi pri-
ori, while BIT provisions for investor-State arbitration do not override exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses in later investment contracts, if they had this effect for earlier 
contracts. 146 The Tribunal found that: 147 
140 SGS Sociere Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n 108, para 
137. 
141 SGS Societe Generale de Surveilla11ce S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n 108, para 
141. 
142 SGS Sociere Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
141. 
143 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. V Republic of the Philippines, auove n I 08, para 
141. 
144 Schreuer, above n 7, art 26 para 34. 
145 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
141. 
146 SGS Sociere Generale de Surveilla11ce S.A. v Republic of the Philippi11es, above n I 08, para 
142. 
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The deci sive point is that the Lex posterior principle only applies as between instruments 
of the sa me lega l character. By contrast what we have here is a bilateral treaty, which 
provides the public international law framework for investments between the two States, 
and a spec ific contract governed by national law. 
Contrary to the Tribunal's finding, Professor Crivellaro, a member of the 
present Tribunal, was of the opinion that the dispute settlement clause in the BIT, 
postdating the CISS Agreement, was intended to override an exclusive jurisdic-
tion clause in the investment contract, so far as contractual claims are con-
cemed.148 
Crivellaro claimed that the BIT had "created a completely new law and 
has conferred on SGS new or additional rights of forum selection". 149 In his un-
derstanding, Article VIII (2) of the BIT intends to offer the investor the uncondi-
tioned right to submit the dispute 'either to the national jurisdiction ( ... ) or to in-
ternational arbitration'. 150 Emphasizing the words 'either ... or .. .' he is of the 
opinion that it was the host-State 's intention to offer an additional forum option, 
left to the investor's choice151. He asserts, the practical significance of the BIT 
being able to choose a preferential forum amongst those offered by the host-State 
would "seriously diminish if such particular privilege, which is the most attrac-
tive to foreign investors, is put into doubt or denied" 152. 
He expressed his doubts whether the maxims generalia specialibus non 
derogant and lex posterior deragat legi priori could be extended to the compari-
son between a treaty and a contract. 153 Crivellaro contended Article VIII(2) of 
the Swiss Philippines BIT grants the investor more favourable treatment in re-
147 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n 108, para 
142. 
148 Crivellaro Antonio "Declaration" re ferring to SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. 
Republic of the Philippines (JCSLD Case No. ARB/02/6), January 29, 2004. 
149 Crivellaro, above n 148, para 2. 
15° Crivellaro, above n 148, para 3. 
15 1 Crivellaro, above n 148, para 3. 
152 Crivellaro, above n 148, para 6. 
153 Crivellaro, above n 148, para 9. 
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spect of the CISS Agreement in matter of dispute settlement. 154 In this context he 
asserted: 155 
If a rule of interpretation is needed, thi s should be found in another principle of law: 
when a provision which is intended to confer an advantage to a certain party, here Arti-
cle YDI (2), may have two meanings, one should retain the meaning which is less re-
strictive or more favourable to the beneficiary. The grantor and, respectively, the benefi-
ciary of the more favourable treatment are still the same parties who agreed on Article 
12 of the CISS Agreement, the Philippines and SGS. As between these two parties, the 
rule giving prevalence to the most favourable treatment certainly applies. It is in this 
principle that one should find the rule of interpretation which best harmonizes with the 
BIT essential purposes. 
In this author's opinion the Tribunal's finding is co1Tect. The dispute set-
tlement clause in the BIT, postdating the CISS Agreement, does not override the 
exclusive jurisdiction clause in the investment contract, so far as contractual 
claims are concerned. 
Some of Crivellaro objections are certainly arguable but do not necessar-
ily confute the Tribunal's argument. The basic principles he referred to in terms 
of the most favourable treatment are generally applicable. However, the present 
author does not believe that this principle fits to the drawn comparison, as an in-
vestment contract and BIT are two completely different sources and hardly com-
parable. Further, it is arguable if his interpretation harmonized best with BIT es-
sential purposes, which lie in the protection of investment - a purpose that cannot 
unilaterally be seen in the protection of the investor 's interests. 
Crivellaro also stated that the Tribunal's finding diminished the practical 
significance of the BIT. This argument is not convincing as the practical signifi-
cance of the BIT was the topic of the present case. Hence, his conclusion was 
based on an inter se argument. The objection was only appropriate in terms of 
contractual claims since it was beyond controversy that the BIT claim was not 
affected by the CISS Agreement. 
154 Crivellaro, above n 148, para 10. 
155 Cri vel Iara, above n 148, para I 0. 
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However, the Tribunal's approach is not always free from contradiction 
either. It is not convincing to derive its decision from the character of a BIT as a 
treaty framework which cannot override or replace the investment arrangements 
negotiated between the investor and the host State. This ignores the fact that the 
BIT contains a specific dispute resolution provision. In another context, the 
Swiss Philippines BIT provisions are given "substantive" effect. Therefore, the 
BIT is not merely a framework. 
To the contrary, the posterior derogat legi priori argument is convincing. 
From a lay man 's point of view only things of the same kind are comparable. The 
Tribunal also raised the question of what would happen if the BIT or the contract 
were renewed. From this point of view, it could no longer be said which one 
would be the prior and which one the latter. This indicates that the maxim lex 
posterior does not necessarily fit the comparison of a BIT and an investment 
contract. "A distinction between earlier and later exclusive jurisdiction clauses in 
contracts cannot therefore be accepted-unless expressly provided for, which is 
not the case with the BIT which the Tribunal has to interpret". 156 
In addition, the present author is of the opinion that it would be contradic-
tory if the BIT provision overrode the one in the CISS Agreement. First, it would 
deprive the contractual provision of relevance. Second, it would be inconsistent 
with the general principle venire contra factum proprium. Based on the claim-
ant's argument, the investor could one the one side agree a special dispute set-
tlement clause with the host-State and ignore the same one later relying on the 
different BIT dispute settlement clause. 
Finally, the present author holds the opinion that it would be in contradic-
tion to Article 25 ICSID Convention if a BIT provision overrode a special con-
tractual dispute settlement agreement in terms of contractual breaches. As al-
ready discussed above, Article 25 ICSID Convention requires a dispute arising 
"directly" out of an investment. "This means that, no matter what the parties 
156 SGS Sociere Genera le de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
142. 
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have agreed, the dispute must not only be connected to an investment but must 
also be reasonably closely connected". 157 This requirement is one of the objective 
criteria and therefore not at the disposition of the parties. 158 If the BIT provision 
overrode the contractual one, the first one would be the only effective dispute 
settlement clause. As the Tribunal stated that contractual claims are disputes 
"with respect to an investment" 159 ICSID's jurisdiction would be all-embracing 
as there would be no other effective dispute settlement clause. Such a result 
would be incompatible with the non-dispositional objective criteria that a dispute 
has to arise "directly" out of an investment. 
E Is Article 12 CJSS Agreement Overridden by the ICSID Convention? 
SGS argued that, when the present proceedings were commenced in 
2002, consent was thereby given by the parties to ICSID jurisdiction "to the ex-
clusion of any other remedy", including that provided for in the CISS Agree-
ment.160 This raises the question whether Article 26 ICSID Convention has to be 
interpreted differently. 
The Tribunal held that "Article 12 of the CISS Agreement and the later 
agreement to ICSID Arbitration constituted by the terms of Article VIII of the 
BIT in association with the request for arbitration" are of the same character be-
tween the parties. 161 In respect of the above discussion it tended to say that 
SGS's objection had not already been precluded by principle considerations. 
However, the Tribunal did not share SGS's point of view. The travaux 
preparatoires of Article 26 ICSID Convention stipulated that the Article was in-
tended "as a rule of interpretation , not a mandatory rule" 162 . The view that Arti-
157 Schreuer, above n 7, art 25 para 67 . 
158 Schreuer, above n 7 , art 25 para 67 . 
159 As required by art VIII of the Swiss Philippines BIT. 
160 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08 , paras 
144 - 145. 
161 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08 , para 
145. 
162 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. 1• Republic of the Philippines, above n 108, para 
146. 
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cle 26 provided a mandatory overriding of the previously agreed dispute settle-
ment clauses would lead to contradictory results as well: "[A] party to a contract 
containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause would obtain an override if it opted 
for ICSID arbitration by virtue of Article 26, but not if it opted for UNCITRAL 
arbitration since the UNCITRAL Rules contain no equivalent provision".163 
Therefore the Tribunal correctly dismissed the respondent 's objections. A new 
approach to Article 26 ICSID Convention's reading was not es tablished. 
F Effect Given to Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses in Arbitral Practice -
Distinction between Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
With regard to the Vivendi case the Tribunal found that it was "doubtful 
that a private party can by contract waive rights or dispe nse with the performance 
of obligations imposed on the States parties to those treaties under international 
law" .164 It clearly distinguished the admissibility of a claim and ICSID ' s jurisdic-
tion. Having jurisdiction granted by the BIT the question was "whether a party 
should be allowed to rely on a contract as the basis of its claim when the contract 
itself refers that claim exclusively to another forum" and not to ICSID. 165 The 
conclusion reached by the Tribunal was that it could not, save in exceptional cir-
cumstances. 166 
Referring to the above considerations, the Tribunal he ld tha t its jurisdic-
tion in the current case was defined by reference to the BIT and the ICSID Con-
vention.1 67 But it "should not exercise its jurisdiction over a contractual claim 
when the parties have already agreed on how such a claim is to be resolved, and 
163 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A . v Rep11blic of the Philippines, above n I 08 , para 
148. 
164 SGS Sociere Generate de Surveillance S.A. V Rep11blic of the Philippines, above 11 I 08, para 
154. 
165 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above 11 108, para 
154. 
166 SGS Societe Generate de S11rveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above 11 I 08 , para 
154. 
167 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above 11 I 08, para 
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have done so exclusively". 168 As the dispute raised no questions of breach of the 
BIT independently of a breach of a contract, which was different in the Vivendi 
case, the Tribunal stayed the proceedings. 
G Remarks on the Present Adjudication 
Both SGS v Pakistan and SGS v Philippines arrived at the same result -
although by different reasoning. Both gave effect to the contractual dispute set-
tlement clause in terms of purely contractual claims. However, the result in SGS 
v Philippines is surprising. While in the case against Pakistan, the Tribunal re-
fused to give effect to the "umbrella clause" and to claim jurisdiction over purely 
contractual claims, the present Tribunal held that ICSID had jurisdiction and that 
the "umbrella clause" was effective. Having made this effort, it appeared surpris-
ing, but not necessarily inconsistent, that both Tribunals came to the same result 
in not addressing the contractual claim and respecting the dispute settlement 
clause in the investment contract. However, the present finding is outstandingly 
valuable as it finally cleared controversial positions in general terms as it "out-
shines previous decisions in clarity and consistency". 169 It created a clear system 
of dispute settlement but gave the parties the autonomy to depart from these axi-
oms by special agreement either in the investment contract or in the BIT itself. 
Contractual claims do not, by virtue of an "umbrella clause" automati-
cally amount to treaty breaches. Issues of the extent or content of contractual ob-
ligations are not converted by such a clause. The mere function of an "umbrella 
clause" was to make it a breach of the BIT for the host State to fail to observe 
binding commitments, including contractual commitments, which it has assumed 
with regard to specific investments. 
168 SGS Societe Genera le de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines, above n I 08, para 
155. 
169 Spiermann, above n 92, 189. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
The Vivendi Tribunal exceeded the scope of investment arbitration in re-
lation to dispute settlement through domestic proceedings. This scope was lim-
ited again through the findings of the SGS v Pakistan and SGS v Philippines 
awards - albeit the circumstances were slightly different. The latter awards 
clearly defined and strengthened the role of domestic courts and show a devel-
opment in terms of the interpretation of an " umbrella clause" . Specifically the 
SGS v Philippines award will be important for further arbitration proceedings of 
this kind as it is clear in its language and straightforward in its reasoning. The 
relationship of contractual and non-contractual ICSID arbitration has been 
thereby significantly clarified. This made the solution of problems in this specific 
area for the parties more predictable and also the individually agreed forum se-
lection clause in investment contracts has kept its relevance. 
After the analysis of these awards the question remains why this area is 
so bitterly disputed, that is, why an investor tends to settle an investment dispute 
preferably through ICSID than domestic proceedings? It is not just a question of 
forum shopping. Besides some practical advantages of international arbitration, 
investment arbitration under ICSID has one big advantage, that "no Contracting 
State shall give diplomatic protection". 170 Shany writes that through this rule " the 
Convention bars inter-state adjudication over disputes that parties have agreed to 
submit to ICSID, and regards the right of claim of the individual as exhaus-
tive".1 71 The purpose was to 'remove disputes from the realm of diplomacy and 
bring them back to the realm of law ' .172 As a consequence, the dispute settlement 
process is depoliticized and the investor obtains a direct access to an international 
173 remedy . 
However, clear rules are required in order to avoid competing jurisdiction 
of international and domestic bodies. As shown, the Tribunnls created a system 
170 Art 27 lCSID Convention. 
171Shany Yuval The Competing Jurisdiction of International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford Uni -
versity Press, ew York, 2003) 194. 
172 Shany, above n 171, 194 footnote 48. 
173 Schre uer, above n 7, art 27 para 4. 
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how to deal with such problems. Nevertheless, the present author is of the opin-
ion that these rules are not beyond doubt. This paper therefore suggest that a 
more uniform approach supports a certain harmonization, constancy and clearer 
solution within the overlap of contractual and BIT dispute settlement. There are 
three different possible starting points in order to achieve such harmonization: 
first the creation of a generally binding multilateral investment treaty, second the 
reformation of ICSID into a system comparable to a court system where a con-
stant tribunal exits and third, harmonization through a clearer and more consis-
tent adjudication. Whereas the first two approaches are not basically new in ap-
proach and have already been discussed in literature 174 , the third approach aims 
to modify the present Tribunals' findings by making alternative suggestions. 
Though this paper agrees with the outcome of the SGS v Philippines 
award for the discussed reasons, attaching more importance to the "umbrella 
clause" and less to the agreed forum selection in the investment contract would 
enlarge the scope of ICSID, even if it signified a limitation of the parties' con-
tractual freedom. This would grant the investor a broader access to an interna-
tional dispute settlement remedy and ensure a clearer approach to the solution of 
the problem. 
Another starting point would be to modify the Vivendi Tribunal's finding 
in terms of the "basis of the claim" rule. As criticised, the Tribunal did not men-
tion why it held that the basis was a treaty one. Approving this rule in general 
terms to avoid competing jurisdiction and therefore ensuring a clearer approach, 
this paper suggests relying on the definition of the term "investment" in the BIT 
to assess whether the basis is a BIT or an investment contract. If the basis of the 
claim is covered by an "investment", as stipulated in the BIT, the subject matter 
shall be a BIT one, that is , ICSID would have jurisdiction and vice versa. Such 
an interpretation would make the application of the rule more distinct and more 
predictable. 
174 Compare Sornarajah M The Settle111e111 of Foreign In vestment Disputes (K luwer Law Interna-
tional, The I !ague, 2000) 163; Williams David " International Commercial Arbitration and Glob-
alization - Rev iew and Recourse against Awards Rendered under Investment Treaties" (2003) 
The Journal of World Investment 251, 273. 
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Some questions still remain as the discussion of the findings has shown 
and there will probably be further awards dealing with the current problems. 
evertheless, the dispute settlement in the area of contractual and BIT invest-
ment arbitration has been considerably advanced through the present Tribunals' 
findings. 
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